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Abstract
Suppose that a group of individuals owns collectively a technology which produces a consumption good from an input. A
sharing rule associates input contributions with a vector of consumption. We consider sharing rules that are a convex
combination of the Proportional, the Equal Share and the Equal Benefit Rules. We characterize the subset of sharing rules
that satisfy Pareto efficiency and individual rationality. We also study the outcome of majority voting on this subselection of
sharing rules. Ó 1998 Elsevier Science S.A.
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1. Introduction
Consider a cooperative, i.e. a group of people owning a technology which transforms an input
(labor) in an output (consumption). Inputs are provided by owners. Different proposals on how to
distribute the output can be found in the literature. Roemer and Silvestre (1989), (1993) proposed the
Proportional Solution and the Equal Benefit Solution and Mas-Colell (1980) proposed the Constant
Returns Equivalent Solution (see Roemer (1996) for a survey of this literature). Characterizations of
these and other solutions are provided in Moulin (1990); Moulin and Roemer (1989); Maniquet
(1996).
´In a previous paper (Corchon and Puy, 1997) we present a concept that brings together most of the
previous contributions. It is that of a sharing rule. A sharing rule is a function which specifies the list
of consumptions as a function of input contributions. All solutions mentioned above are sharing rules
except the constant returns equivalent solution. We found that all continuous sharing rules are
compatible with efficiency (i.e. there are allocations which belong to the sharing rule and are Pareto
efficient) and are Nash implementable. We conclude that neither efficiency nor incentives have any
cutting power to reduce the large set of continuous sharing rules.
In this paper we propose alternative properties in order to select efficient sharing rules in economies
with an homogeneous input. This subset, referred to in the sequel as the admissible set, consists of the
*Corresponding author. Tel.: (34-9) 35421672; fax: (34-9) 35421746; e-mail: luis.corchon@econ.upf.es
1
convex combination of the Equal Share, the Proportional and the Equal Benefit sharing rules. These
rules are chosen for two reasons: analytical tractability and popularity in the literature. We investigate
the consequences of imposing two requirements: individual rationality (i.e. there are allocations which
belong to the sharing rule that are Pareto efficient and give, at least, the reservation utility to all
agents) and majority voting among individually rational sharing rules. Our first result, recorded as
Proposition 1, is that a necessary and sufficient condition for a sharing rule in the admissible set to be
individually rational is that the weight given to the equal share rule must be zero. Then, we restrict
attention to economies with quasilinear preferences in the consumption good. This assumption is
equivalent to say that the efficient allocation of labor is independent of consumption, which could be a
good approximation in situations where consumption is not very low. In this class of economies we
show that if the number of agents working more (resp. less) than the average is larger than half of the
whole population, the outcome of majority voting is the Proportional rule (resp. Equal Benefit rule)
(Proposition 2).
2. The model
There is one consumption good produced from a vector of homogeneous inputs using a publicly
owned technology.
¯There are n individuals indexed by i. Let N 5 h1, . . . ,nj. They are endowed each with , [R unitsi 1
of input. Each individual consumption set is defined by
¯X 5 (x ,, ):x [ R ,, [ [0,, ]h ji i i i 1 i i
where x is agent i’s consumption and , is her input contribution. Each agent has preferences definedi i
on X , which can be represented by a utility function:i
u :X fi R.i i
This function is assumed to be concave, differentiable, increasing in x and decreasing in , . Let 8 bei i i
the space of all utility functions satisfying these assumptions. The technology is represented by a
production function
f :R fi R.1
The argument of f is o , , and f is increasing, concave, differentiable and f(0)50. Let ^ be thei[N i
space of technologies satisfying these assumptions.We define the feasible set, denoted by X as
follows:
X 5 (x ,, , . . . ,x ,, ) [P X :O x # f O ,H S DJ1 1 n n i i i
i[N i[N i[N
A feasible allocation is denoted by (x,, )[X where x5(x , . . . ,x ) and , 5(, , . . . ,, ). An economy1 n 1 n
is denoted by e5hu, f j, where u5(u , . . . ,u ) is a list of utility functions. The set of economies is1 n
Edenoted by %5P 8 3^.The Pareto efficient solution w :% fi X associates to each economy ini[N i
the domain the set of Pareto efficient allocations for this economy. Formally,
2
9 9(x,, ) [ X:'⁄ (x9,, 9) [ X /u (x ,, ) $ u (x ,, )h [ Nh h h h h hEw (u, f ) 5H J9 9and u (x ,, ) . u (x ,, ) for at least one j [ Nj j j j j j
A sharing rule P5(P , . . . ,P ) is a list of functions such that1 n
¯ ¯P :P [0,, ] 3 ^ fi R ;i [ N and O P (,, f ) 5 f O , ;, [P [0,, ]S Di i 1 i i i
i[N i[Ni[N i[N
Each P yields the consumption of i as a function of , and f. Moreover P distributes the whole output.i
When the context is clear we will write P (, ). In particular, we define the following three sharingi
rules.
The Proportional Rule:
f O ,S Di
i[Np ]]]P (, ) 5 , ;i [ N,i iO ,i
i[N
in which the amount of output consumed by an agent is proportional to the amount of input that she
contributes.
The Equal Benefit rule:
f O , ≠f O , O ,S D S Di i i
i[N i[N i[Nb ]]] ]]]] ]]1 2P (, ) 5 1 , 2 ;i [ N,i in n≠,i
in which each agent consumes according to her budget constraint of the Walrasian equilibrium with
equal distribution of profits.
The Equal Share rule:
f O ,S Di
i[Ns ]]]P (, ) 5 ;i [ N,i n
in which each agent consumes an equal part of the total output. In this note, we focus attention on a
subfamily of sharing rules denoted by 3 that consists of the convex combinations of the three sharing
rules defined above (see Moulin, 1987; Pfingsten, 1991 for similar examples). We denote a typical
¯ ¯ ¯element of this subfamily by P5(P , . . . ,P ). Thus,1 n
f O , f O , ≠f O , O ,S D S D S Di i i i
i[N i[N i[N i[N
¯ ]]] ]]] ]]]] ]]1 2P (, ) 5 (a 1 g ) 1 b , 1 g , 2i i in n≠,iO ,i
i[N
where a,b,g [R and by adding up over i we get that a 1b 1g 51. In the sequel we consider only1
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¯interior allocations (x,, ) satisfying x 5P (, ) ;i[N and Pareto efficiency. These allocations arei i
SE
¯denoted by w (u, f,P ),
SE E
¯ ¯w (u, f,P ) 5 (x,, ) [ w (u, f ):x 5 P (, );i [ N .h ji i
¯
´Notice that every P is the sum of continuous sharing rules. Therefore Theorem 1 in Corchon and Puy
SE
¯ ¯(1997) implies that for every P [3, w (u, f,P )±f.
3. Individual rationality of sharing rules
First, let us define individual rationality in our framework.
Definition. We say that a sharing rule P is efficient and individually rational if for every (u, f )[%
SEthere is an allocation (x,, )[w (u, f,P) such that u (x ,, )$u (0,0) ;i[N.i i i i
In the above definition we assume that the outside option is zero consumption and zero labor
contribution. Other assumptions on the outside option are also possible (see Fleurbaey and Maniquet,
1996, p. 204). The one used here is the most basic since no work and no consumption is always
possible.
In this section we characterize for the set of all classical economies the subset of sharing rules
contained in 3 that verify efficiency and individual rationality. The key condition that characterizes
this subset is the following property:
Definition. A sharing rule P verifies Proportionality on Linear Economies (PLE) if P coincides with
the Proportional Rule when the technology f displays constant returns to scale.
It is easily seen that PLE is equivalent to the axiom of Free Access on Linear Economies introduced
by Roemer and Silvestre (1989).
¯Lemma 1: For every P[3, a50 if and only if PLE holds.
Proof. Let us prove necessity. Under constant returns to scale
f O ,S Di
i[N]]]f 9(, ) 5 ,O ,i
i[N
and thus,
,1 i
¯ ] ]]P (, ) 5 f O , a 1 (b 1 g ) ;i [ N.S Di i ni[N 3 4O ,i
i[N
PLE implies that,
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f O ,S Di,1 i i[N] ]] ]]]f O , a 1 (b 1 g ) ; ,S Di ini[N 3 4O , O ,i i
i[N i[N
and substituting that a 1b 1g 51 we obtain:
,1 i] ]]a ; a .
n O ,i
i[N
But this equation must hold for every , and thus, a 50. Sufficiency is obvious. Q.E.D.
¯Proposition 1: For every (u, f)[%, PLE is a necessary and sufficient condition for P[3 to be an
efficient and individually rational sharing rule.
¯Proof. First we show that PLE is a necessary condition. Assume that P [3 but it does not verify
¯ ¯
¯PLE. Then we will show that there is an economy (u,f )[% with two agents and where f displays
¯constant returns to scale, such that P is not efficient and individually rational.
¯Because P does not verify PLE, we find that there is an allocation (x*,, *) such that there is a i for
p
¯whom P (, *),P (, *). W.l.o.g. take i51.i i
a11 2
¯ ¯
¯ ¯ ¯Let (u,f ) be such that u 5x 2(s, /a11), u 5x 2t, with a[5 , f(, )5o , , t5(1 /1 1 1 2 2 2 1 i[N i
a SE SE
¯ ¯¯ ¯ ¯* * ¯ ¯2, ) and s5(1 /, ). We find that (P(, *),, *)5w (u,f,P ) for every a, i.e. w (u,f,P ) contains a2 1
p
¯ ¯* ¯unique allocation. But because P (, *),, 5P (, *), taking a sufficiently close to 0, u 5P (, *)21 1 1 1 1
¯ ¯* *(, /(11a)).P (, *)2, ,0 which violates individual rationality. Thus, P is not efficient and1 1 1
individually rational.
Second we show that PLE is a sufficient condition.
0Let us define the function f (, )5x as the indifference curve of agent i, that passes through thei i i
0
origin (x ,, )5(0,0). By concavity of u , f is a convex function and thus:i i i i
0 0
≠f (, ) f (, )i i i i]]] ]]]$ for ;i [ N, (3.1)
≠, ,i i
from the implicit function theorem we have that
≠u (x ,, )i i i]]]0
≠f (, ) ≠,i i i]]] ]]]5 2 . (3.2)
≠, ≠u (x ,, )i i i i]]]
≠xi
Next, let us assume that the result is not true. This implies that there is an economy (u, f )[% and a
SEP9[3 satisfying PLE such that for every (x9,, 9)[w (u, f,P9),
09 9 9P (, 9) 5 x , f (, ) for at least one i [ N, (3.3)i i i i
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By Pareto efficiency and interiority of (x9,, 9), the following condition holds:
9 9≠u (x ,, )i i i]]]]
≠x 2 1i]]]] ]]]]5 ;i [ N. (3.4)9 9≠u (x ,, )i i i]]]] 9≠f O ,S Di≠,i i[N]]]]
≠,i
From Eqs. (3.1)–(3.4) we have that
9≠f O ,0 S Di9≠f (, )i i i[N09 9 9 ]]] 9 ]]]]P (, 9) , f (, ) # , 5 , for at least one i [ N.i i i i i≠, ≠,i i
9Substituting P and by concavity of f,i
9 9 9 9≠f O , O , O , ≠f O ,S D S Di i i i
i[N i[N i[N i[N]]]] ]] 9 9 ]] 9 ]]]]3 1 24(a 1 g ) 1 b, 1 g , 2 , , .i i in n≠, ≠,i i
Simplifying and taking into account that b 512a 2g, we obtain that
9O , i
i[N]] 9a , a, .in
Finally, by PLE and Lemma 1, we have that a 50; but then we obtain a contradiction. Q.E.D.
Notice that the necessity part works for any set of admissible sharing rules.
4. Voting on sharing rules
In this section we consider the subset of sharing rules that verify efficiency and individual
rationality in the set 3. By the result obtained in Section 3 these sharing rules can be expressed as
follows for each i[N,
f O , ≠f O , O , f O ,S D S D S Di i i i
i[N i[N i[N i[N
ˆ ]]] ]]]] ]] ]]]1 1 22P (g,, ) 5 g 1 , 2 1 (1 2 g ) , .i i in n≠, O ,i
i[N
To facilitate the analysis we assume that n is an odd number. In the sequel we assume that the
preferences of the individuals are represented by quasilinear utility functions, i.e.
u (x ,, ) 5 x 2 v (, ), ;i [ N,i i i i i i
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where v is a convex and increasing function. Let %95(u, f ) be the set of economies where u is ai
profile of utility functions satisfying the previous assumption and f is a strictly concave production
1function. In this set of economies each g not only specifies a sharing rule, but it also determines
SE
ˆuniquely an efficient allocation (x,, )[w (u, f,P ) (as is made clear in the proof below).
Lemma 2: For every economy (u, f)[%9, each agent preferences defined over g[[0,1] are single
peaked with peak in g50 or g51.
Proof. Take an economy (u, f )[%9. We first show that each g [[0,1] determines a unique allocation
SE
ˆ ˆˆ
ˆ ˆ(x,, )[w (u, f,P(g,, )). By Pareto efficiency we find that the allocation (x,, ) satisfies the condition:
≠f O ,S Di ≠v (, )i[N i i]]]] ]]]5 for ;i [ N.
≠, ≠,i i
ˆBy strict convexity of preferences, the above condition determines a unique vector , of input
contributions that is independent of g.
Therefore the first derivative of u with respect to g ;i[N, is:i
ˆ ˆf O , ≠f O , O ,S D S Di i iˆ ˆˆ ˆˆ≠u (P(g,, ),, ) ≠P(g,, )i i i[N i[N i[N
ˆ]]]]] ]]] ]]] ]]]] ]]1 25 5 2 ? 2 ,i≠g ≠g n≠,1 2ˆO ,i
i[N
By strict concavity of f, the first term of the expression is always positive. We then find two kinds of
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆagents:Those agents for whom (o , ) /(n)., and those agents for whom (o , ) /(n),, . Thei[N i i i[N i i
former have increasing marginal utility in g and their peak is in g 51. The others have decreasing
marginal utility in g and their peak is in g 50. Q.E.D.
Lemma 2 guarantees that there is an g that is a Condorcet winner (Black, 1958). Let us order
agents in terms of their labor contributions. We denote the agent in the median by m. Agent m is the
one occupying the place (n11) /(2) in the order. The result of majority voting depends on the
ˆcomparison of , and labor per capita.m
ˆ ˆProposition 2. If , ,(o , ) /(n), the outcome of majority voting is the Equal Benefit Rule.Ifm i[N i
ˆ ˆ, .(o , ) /n, the outcome of majority voting is the Proportional Rule.m i[N i
Proof. From Lemma 2 we can order agents according to the labor contribution in the unique Pareto
efficient allocation. Then, the result follows. Q.E.D.
Proposition 2 suggests a polarization among the members of a cooperative. On the one hand those
agents who are relatively ‘hard working’ would like rewards to be proportional to effort. On the other
hand those agents who are relatively ‘lazy’ would favor equal benefit. It would be interesting to
1 The constant returns to scale technology is not interesting any more because all the sharing rules considered in this section
satisfy PCR.
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consider a model in which agents can move from a cooperative to another (‘vote with their feet’ as in
the celebrated Tiebout, 1956 model). The formalization of this idea in a full-blown model is left for
future research.
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